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ABSTRACT
History conﬁrms that while technological innovations can
bring many beneﬁts, they can also cause much human
suffering, environmental degradation and economic
costs. But are we repeating history with new and
emerging chemical and technological products? In
preparation for volume 2 of ‘Late Lessons from Early
Warnings’ (European Environment Agency, 2013), two
analyses were carried out to help answer this question.
A bibliometric analysis of research articles in 78
environmental, health and safety (EHS) journals revealed
that most focused on well-known rather than on newly
emerging chemicals. We suggest that this ‘scientiﬁc
inertia’ is due to the scientiﬁc requirement for high levels
of proof via well replicated studies; the need to publish
quickly; the use of existing intellectual and technological
resources; and the conservative approach of many
reviewers and research funders. The second analysis
found that since 1996 the funding of EHS research
represented just 0.6% of the overall funding of research
and technological development (RTD). Compared with
RTD funding, EHS research funding for information and
communication technologies, nanotechnology and
biotechnology was 0.09%, 2.3% and 4% of total
research, respectively. The low EHS research ratio seems
to be an unintended consequence of disparate funding
decisions; technological optimism; a priori assertions of
safety; collective hubris; and myopia. In light of the
history of past technological risks, where EHS research
was too little and too late, we suggest that it would be
prudent to devote some 5–15% of RTD on EHS research
to anticipate and minimise potential hazards while
maximising the commercial longevity of emerging
technologies.
INTRODUCTION
Investment in technological innovation is a public
policy priority in Europe and in many other
regions of the world. Large amounts of public
money are spent on new and emerging technologies
and on their product applications in order to create
jobs, prosperity and wealth. For instance, since
1984 more than €18 billion of the EU Framework
Research budgets has been spent on developing
information and communication technologies
(ICTs). And the European Commission announced
in 2013 that the two science project winners of the
EU’s Future and Emerging Technologies competi-
tion, on mapping the intricacies of the human
brain, and on exploring the carbon-based material
graphene, will each receive up to €1 billion over
the next decade.1
There are already thousands of promising and
rapidly spreading yet novel commercialised
products that are based on the emerging chemicals
and Nano, Bio, and Information and
Communication (NBIC) technologies. However,
while technological innovations can bring many
beneﬁts, they can also cause much human suffering,
environmental degradation and economic costs.
In 2001, the European Environment Agency
(EEA) published their ﬁrst of two reports on ‘Late
Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000’ documenting numerous cases
such as PCBs, sulfur dioxide, benzene, asbestos, tri-
butyltin (TBT), and the pharmaceutical agent
diethylstilbestrol (DES) where failure to apply the
precautionary principle resulted in much harm and
delayed innovation.2 In 2013, the European
Environment Agency (EEA) published a second
report ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings:
Precaution, Science, Precaution, Innovation’.3
which analysed a further 20 case studies focusing,
as in volume I, on the growth of knowledge about
their hazards and related actions or inactions by
decision makers. The cases analysed included lead
in petrol, Bisphenol A, neonicotinoid insecticides,
Minamata disease and perchloroethylene (PCE)
contamination, as well as some emerging technolo-
gies including genetically modiﬁed crops, nanotech-
nology and mobile phones. The second report also
covered cross-cutting issues such as the economic
consequences of inaction; why businesses ignored
robust early warnings; the precautionary principle;
false positives; and science for precautionary deci-
sion making. The report showed that precautionary
environmental health regulation does not hamper
innovation and concluded that there is a need to
reduce delays between early warnings and actions,
to rethink and enrich environment and health
research, to improve the quality of risk assessments,
and to foster greater public participation in choos-
ing innovation pathways.
The histories of the now well-known technologies
and chemicals in the ‘Late Lessons’ reports showed
that a lack of anticipatory research into the early
warning signs of their hazards contributed to the
failure to take timely actions to prevent or minimise
the serious, widespread and continuing harm to the
public and environments caused by these technolo-
gies and products. Two of the ‘Twelve Late Lessons’
from volume 1 of ‘Late Lessons’ speciﬁcally
addressed the issue of anticipatory research by
calling for ‘adequate’ research into knowledge gaps
and early warnings; for more long-term monitoring;
and for the promotion of robust, diverse and adapt-
able technologies that would help to “minimise the
costs of ‘surprises’ and maximise the beneﬁts of
innovation”.2 Is there evidence that these lessons
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have been reﬂected in choices about the nature and extent of
anticipatory research into the potential environmental, health
and safety (EHS) hazards of emerging chemicals and NBIC tech-
nologies? In preparation for volume 2 of ‘Late Lessons’ two
kinds of analyses were carried out in order to help answer this
question. The ﬁrst focused on the share of research between the
historical and emerging chemicals that are, or have been, the
basis for many consumer products. The second looked at the
share of European funded research on developing new technolo-
gies and on anticipating their potential hazards.
EHS RESEARCH ON CHEMICALS: ‘SCIENTIFIC INERTIA’?
In an analysis of 78 environmental and health journals,
Grandjean4 revealed that since 2000 most research has focused
on chemicals whose ﬁrst early warnings about their hazards
were identiﬁed some 20–100 years ago, such as those reviewed
in the ﬁrst volume of ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings’,
namely polychlorinated biphenyl (PCBs), sulfur dioxide,
benzene, asbestos, TBT, methyl tert-butyl ether (MBTE) and the
pharmaceutical agent DES.2 Of the nearly 15 000 articles pub-
lished on these substances since 1899, Grandjean et al found
that some 40% had been published since 2000. For other well
established toxicants such as lead, mercury and dichlorodiphe-
nyltrichloroethane (DDT) which were reviewed in the second
volume of ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings’, a similar pattern
emerged: there were 15 000 articles published between 2000
and 2009 on lead, mercury and DDT alone. Meanwhile,
research on eight of the emerging, large production chemicals
identiﬁed as priorities by the US Environmental Protection
Agency (US EPA),5 such as 1,3-dichlorobenzene, featured in
only 352 of all the articles published in the 78 environment and
health journals over the same period: ﬁve other chemicals on
the US EPA priority list did not feature in any of the articles. A
similar picture emerged when the article analysis was extended
to 2011.6 Of course new scientiﬁc insights can emerge from
more research into even well-known chemicals. We are not
therefore suggesting the cessation of further research on rela-
tively well-known chemicals but just a rebalancing of total
research effort towards emerging priority chemicals.
The focus of research on well-known rather than emerging
priority chemicals, which Grandjean calls ‘scientiﬁc inertia’,
seems to be due to a number of factors: the traditional scientiﬁc
requirement for high levels of proof via well-replicated studies;
the inﬂuence of senior academics who favour the chemicals they
know most about; the need to use costly laboratory infrastruc-
ture designed mainly for the ‘old’ chemicals which can be most
easily analysed; the need to publish quickly; and the conserva-
tive nature of many reviewers and research funders who are
more likely to see results on time from studies of well-known
chemicals than from the riskier proposals to study the less
known.4 In addition, a history of corporate pushback against lit-
erature exposing risks associated with their products has also
been well-documented, which might also add to scientiﬁc
inertia.2 3
Scientiﬁc inertia increases the chance of hazards from new
chemical products emerging as ‘surprises’. It also tends to stiﬂe
scientiﬁc innovation in those disciplines needed to identify
emerging hazards such as epidemiology, exposure assessment,
toxicology, endocrinology and development biology. We know
from the well-known hazards, for example, benzene, asbestos,
X-rays, lead, mercury, tobacco, vinyl chloride and DES, that
many of the early warnings were generated, strengthened, and
then conﬁrmed by epidemiological research. More research into
the hazards of emerging chemicals and their less intrinsically
hazardous alternatives, as well as more long-term health moni-
toring of consumers and environments, would encourage the
use and development of scientiﬁc innovations in ﬁelds such as
analytical and green chemistry, biomonitoring and epigenetics.
Of course long-term epidemiological monitoring of chemicals
cannot be very anticipatory compared with the much less time
needed to get results from animal and other laboratory experi-
ments. This is why public health needs to be protected by causal
inferences based mainly on good laboratory evidence. This view
is supported by the approach used by the International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC) for attributing carcinogenicity.
The value of animal testing in predicting carcinogenicity is dis-
cussed by Huff in the ‘Late Lessons’ chapter on vinyl chloride.3
EHS RESEARCH ON NBIC TECHNOLOGIES: A CASE OF
MYOPIA?
Figures on the public funding of research on new technologies
and on their potential hazards can be derived from the
European Commission reports on its Framework Programmes
(FPs) for research and technological development (RTD). There
have been seven FPs spanning the last 20 years and in many
cases, various Commission reports have accessed the
EHS-component of the funded research grants and projects in
one manner or another. Often, the EHS-component is unspeci-
ﬁed and although we acknowledge that what deﬁnes as
EHS-research can vary and that not all research grants and
project might fall neatly into one category or the other, we rely
on the European Commission self-classiﬁcation of EHS-research
in this paper.
For the FP4–6, between 1996 and 2006, the EHS-research
corresponded to a mere 0.6% of the total RTD budget (see
table 1A). The latest FP7 programme, which ran from 2007 to
2013, continues this focus on research and technological devel-
opment rather than on anticipating and minimising potential
hazards. For example, during the ﬁrst three FP7 calls for propo-
sals some 79 funded projects had an (unspeciﬁed) EHS compo-
nent according to the European Commission totalling €265
million.7 In comparison, the total budget of FP7 is more than
€50 billion8 which gives a RTD/EHS-research ratio of 200 to 1
as just 0.5% of the total RTD budget went to EHS research.
When it comes to NBIC technologies speciﬁcally, the
EHS-research proportion is a little higher, although information
is not available for all the FPs.
During FP7, €3.5 billion has been provided for Nanosciences,
nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies.8
In comparison, 25 projects have been given €82 million by
2011 to study the health and environmental impact of nanoma-
terials, which corresponds to 2.3%.13 These absolute amounts
were more than twice the total spent on nanotechnology under
FP6,10 12 13 but the RTD/EHS ratio was similar corresponding
to 2.1%.
On biotechnology, only one EHS-research relevant project
has been funded on genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMSAFOOD worth €2.6 million) after the ﬁrst three calls of
FP7.7 In contrast, €1.935 billion have been set aside under the
theme ‘Food, Agriculture and Biotechnology’ in FP7,8 which
yields a RTD/EHS-research ratio of about a 1000 : 1. Under
FP6, €2.514 billion was set aside under the thematic priority
‘Life Sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health’.17 In
contrast, only some €200 million was spent on EHS-research,18
which corresponds to 8% for the total RTD budget of this
theme. Under FP5 and FP4 the themes on ‘Quality of Life and
management of living resources’ and on the ‘Biotechnology pro-
gramme’, received some €3 billion.14 15 of which only some €70
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million was spent on EHS research,16 corresponding to 2.3%.
The total funding under FP1–7 came to €7.5 billion of which
the EHS component came to €273 million, corresponding to
4% (see table 1C).
The RTD/EHS-research ratio for ICT is much smaller than
even the modest ratios for nano and biotechnologies. The FP7
programme provided €8.9 million for EHS projects during the
ﬁrst three calls for proposals7 compared with €9.1 billion that
has been earmarked for ICT,8 yielding a RTD/EHS-research
ratio of about 1000 to 1. Under FP6 nothing seems to have
been allocated to EHS-research on ICT,21 but 8.8 million was
spent on EHS under FP1–5.19 20 In total the EHS research
budget related to ICT was a mere 0.09% of the budget that
went into RTD of ICT under FP1–7 (see table 1D). The poten-
tial hazards of ICT seem intrinsically less than for nano and bio-
technologies and this may justify the much lower RTD/
EHS-research ratio. However, the classiﬁcation of the non-
ionising radiations from mobile phones as a 2B (‘possible’) car-
cinogen by the IARC in 2011 is a cause for serious concern that
should generate follow-up research.22 The IARC classiﬁcation
has been controversial partly because it was based on just two
large epidemiological studies which indicated possible brain
cancer risks, according to most experts at the IARC
meeting.23 24 A lack of relevant animal data and divergent inter-
pretations of the epidemiological data provide much scope for
further research.
The overall European public funding of research into the
potential hazards of the NBIC technologies during the FP1–7
programmes yields a RTD/EHS ratio of about 100 to 1.3 (some
€402 million compared with some €31 billion: see table 1).
The low RTD/EHS-research ratio on the European level may
be offset by higher RTD/EHS-research ratios in the EU Member
States, but these ﬁgures are not readily available. However, it
has been noted that between 2004 and 2009 some £220 million
was spent on applications of nanotechnologies by the UK
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council compared
with less than £20 million on the potential EHS hazards from
nanotechnology by the Medical Research Council and other
government funded bodies.25
In contrast, The Netherlands apparently has a public RTD/
EHS-research ratio for nanotechnology of 85/15 (Personal com-
munication). Given the human suffering, environmental degrad-
ation and economic costs that have been associated with past
‘wonder technologies’, the question is how the overall RTD/
EHS ratios that we have identiﬁed have come about and why
are they so low? Are they the result of informed deliberation by
research funders, or are they emergent properties of a complex
and decentralised system of funding which nobody ‘chooses’
and for which, therefore nobody is responsible? Could there be
collective hubris about the low likelihood of potential harm
from ‘new’ emerging technologies? Or myopia about potential
hazards, or even ‘willful blindness’ which seems to be a
common feature of life?26
The historical case studies in the ‘Late Lessons’ reports
provide many examples of authoritative but unsubstantiated
assertions of safety about the then emerging technologies which
helped justify very little research into potential hazards. For
example, an expert asbestos witness told the UK Parliamentary
inquiry on asbestos in 1906 that “one hears, generally speaking,
that considerable trouble is now taken to prevent the inhalation
of the dust so that the disease is not so likely to occur as hereto-
fore”27 And the General Motors ‘inventor’ of leaded petrol told
the US Surgeon General in 1925 that “the average street will be
so free from lead that it will be impossible to detect it or its
absorption” even though “no actual experimental data has been
taken”.28
Such largely unsubstantiated assertions of safety are to be
found in current discussions about the NBIC technologies as
well. For example, it is sometimes asserted that there are no
long-term health hazards from genetically modiﬁed crop in food
despite the virtual absence of full-term animal studies to demon-
strate this; that there are no brain cancer hazards to children
from mobile phones despite there being virtually no long-term
studies in children covering the relevant latent period for brain
cancers; and that there are no chronic hazards from nanoparti-
cles even though there are virtually no studies to demonstrate
long-term safety. These assertions are based on the mistaken
assumption that ‘no evidence of harm’ is the same as ‘evidence
of no harm’.
Low public RTD/EHS funding ratios could also be due to an
aversion against looking for risks that could be ‘inconvenient’ to
ﬁnd; and a tendency to leave it to promoters and developers of
a given technology to complete the EHS research which can
‘crowd out’ public research. For example, the leaded petrol
industry controlled virtually all of the rather meagre EHS
Table 1 EU funding of RTD and EHS-research in NBIC
technologies and overall under the FP1–7
Research
programme
Overall RTD
funding
(billion €)
Overall EHS
funding
(million €)
RTD/EHS-research
(%)
(A) Research and Technology Development
FP4 13 2159 n.a. n.a.
FP5 14 96010 1607 1
FP6 17 50011 ≈2007 1
FP7 50.58 2657* 0.5*
Total 96 175 625 0.6
Research
programme
Nanotechnology
total (billion €)
Nanotechnology
EHS research
(million €)
RTD/EHS-research
(%)
(B) Nanotechnology
FP1–5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
FP6 1.412 3013 2.1
FP7 3.58 8213 2.3
Total 4.9 112 2.3
Research
programme
Biotechnology
total (billion €)
Biotechnology
EHS research
(million €)
RTD/EHS-research
(%)
(C) Biotechnology
FP1–5 315 7016 2.3
FP6 2.51417 20018 8
FP7 1.9358 2.67* 0.1*
Total 7449 2726 4
Research
programme
ICT total
(billion €)
EMF EHS research
(million €)
RTD/EHS-research
(%)
(D) Information and communication technologies (ICTs)
FP1–5 5.6859 19 8.8†20 0.15
FP6 3.98421 021 0
FP7 9.1108 8.97* 0.1*
Total 18.779 17.7 0.09
*After three calls.
†Sum of the FP5 projects CEMFEC, GUARD, INTERPHONE, RAMP 2001 and PERFORM A.
EHS, environmental, health and safety; EMF, electromagnetic field; FP, Framework
Programmes; NBIC, Nano, Bio, and Information and Communication; RTD, research and
technological development.
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research into leaded petrol hazards from the 1920s to the
1960s28; and the six largest breeding and genetic engineering
companies in the food sector control a research budget that is
over eight times larger than that of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research, the world’s largest public
sector agricultural food body.29
It is not known how much of this agricultural research by
companies is spent on the potential EHS hazards of their bio-
technologies. The technology companies’ contribution to EHS
research on nanotechnology and ICT is also difﬁcult to identify.
In 2010, a UK House of Lords report criticised the food indus-
try for “failing to be transparent about its research into the uses
of nanotechnology and nanomaterials”.25 It would be helpful if
this information were to be disclosed for the food industries
and for other industries as well. If history repeats itself the tech-
nology company expenditure on EHS research is likely to be
low in comparison with their total RTD research budget. There
is little incentive for companies to do research on the potential
hazards of their own products, unless mandated by law, because
most health and environmental harm from commercial technol-
ogy and products is externalised onto societies and their tax-
payers.30 31 As a consequence there have been some proposals
to incentivise technology producers to conduct more anticipa-
tory EHS research, such as product taxes, for example on
mobile phones, with the revenue being spent on EHS
research24; and anticipatory assurance bonds that would be
posted by large-scale novel technology producers which would
eventually be returned to them, with interest, if potential
hazards do not materialise.32
EHS research by technology producers also needs to over-
come the ‘funding bias’ and commercial pressures to downplay
hazards, which have been extensively reported in the past.33–35
It would therefore seem prudent to insulate company
EHS-research from commercial pressures by erecting administra-
tive barriers between their funding and its use by independent
scientists, while balancing commercial secrecy with access to
research materials and regulatory test data, as with genetically
modiﬁed organisms (GMOs). For example, 24 leading corn
insect scientists wrote to the US EPA concerning the way GMO
technology agreements ‘explicitly prohibit research’36 (in order
to access Monsanto test data on the safety of a GM product,
submitted to the European Food Safety Agency, independent
scientists had to use the German courts to access and verify the
data37) and independent epidemiological research into mobile
phones was delayed in the USA by legal action.38 Meanwhile, as
the public funding of RTD, including EHS research, is a subsidy
to the private sector it may need to be repaid to taxpayers by
appropriate royalty payments.39
TOWARDS ‘ADEQUATE’ EHS RESEARCH?
What would be a prudent RTD/EHS-research ratio in light of
the histories of asbestos, mercury, leaded petrol and other
hazards analysed by the EEA in ‘Late Lessons from Early
Warnings’?
Ideally we should be able to identify comparable RTD/
EHS-research ratios for historical technologies but we are not
aware of such ﬁgures for the cases covered in the EEA ‘Late
Lessons’ reports. However, it is clear from the historical narra-
tives in the EEA chapters that very little research was devoted to
identifying hazards of, for example, asbestos, mercury, leaded
petrol, dibromochloropropane (DBCP), and X-rays at the time
when such research would have been useful in minimising their
future hazards. We have seen from the Grandjean analysis that
most of the EHS research into even the most well-established
hazardous chemicals was conducted in the last 10–15 years,
which was many decades after their widespread use in consumer
products began. Despite some early warnings from epidemio-
logical research about, for example, benzene in 1897,40 asbestos
in 190641 and leaded petrol in 1926,28 there were no follow-up
studies until many decades later. It is reasonable to conclude
from the historical technologies and products analysed by the
EEA that there was very little anticipatory research into their
potential hazards and that the EHS-research remained very
small until well after the hazards were manifest.
The harmful consequences of EHS research, that was too
little and too late has been extensive. The epidemiological and
other research into well-known hazards that was eventually
carried out has demonstrated that the nature and extent of
harm expanded well beyond the hazards that were ﬁrst identi-
ﬁed. For example, asbestos has been found to cause an increas-
ing range of diseases, with the main ones being asbestosis in
1929, lung cancer in 1955 and mesothelioma in 1960. These
diseases have been found in an increasing variety of exposed
groups, such as asbestos producers and users; bystanders to
users; building occupants, families of asbestos workers, and
neighbours, teachers, etc, and such diseases have also been
shown to be capable of being caused by lower levels of expos-
ure. A similar picture of expanding harm among an increasing
variety of exposure groups caused by lower exposure levels than
was previously thought possible has been eventually uncovered
by research on lead, tobacco, PCBs, DES, etc.2 3
The health impacts on victims are incalculable but the ﬁnan-
cial costs to societies are also large. Andersen and Club30 have
estimated that leaded petrol alone has caused losses of 4–6% of
gross domestic product (GDP) in lost productivity from reduced
IQ. Other harmful consequences of inaction on early warnings
include damage to the commercial longevity of the products;
inequitable sharing of the costs of harm between the risk crea-
tors, risk victims and risk bearers; skewed and ‘information-
poor’ impact assessments and cost/beneﬁt analyses; delays in the
production of scientiﬁc knowledge and insights into the bio-
logical and ecological effects of the technologies; delays in the
creation of technological and ‘benign by design’ innovations;
increased public distrust of industries and regulators who failed
to anticipate hazards; and increased regulatory and public pres-
sure to regulate on the basis of hazard, and not risk, particularly
when there is an absence of information about relevant
exposures.
Identiﬁcation of the prudent RTD/EHS-research ratio is not
possible and any suggested ratio will inevitably seem somewhat
arbitrary, but in order to avoid the costly consequences of inad-
equate anticipatory EHS research, we suggest that a prudent
RTD/EHS ratio for NBIC technologies would lie somewhere
between 5% and 15%. The exact ratio depends on the intrinsic
hazard potential, plausible exposure scenarios, and their novelty,
persistence, bioaccumulation potential and spatial range. These
are some of the features of emerging technologies that have
been identiﬁed by the EEA as justifying precautionary actions,
including adequate anticipatory research.42 Such research would
also be part of ‘responsible innovation’, an idea that is gaining
currency.43
There is evidence that there are sufﬁcient knowledge gaps,
uncertainties and areas of scientiﬁc ignorance in the NBIC tech-
nologies that would justify such a substantial increase in EHS
funding. For example, a recent report from WHO on nanoma-
terials notes that there are large knowledge gaps about poten-
tially hazardous properties; biological and ecological exposures;
and about biological and ecological fates and impacts of such
4 Hansen SF, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2014;0:1–6. doi:10.1136/jech-2014-204019
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exposures. It also notes deﬁciencies in current analytical techni-
ques and monitoring methods for early warnings.44 Similarly,
the European Commission’s Scientiﬁc Committee on Newly
Identiﬁed Health Risks has regularly identiﬁed large knowledge
gaps in its reports on radiofrequency (RF) from mobile
phones.45 For example, “research with some frequencies or
modulations is very limited, and this is, particularly true regard-
ing new and emerging technologies; a number of areas were
identiﬁed where the information regarding health effects is
either absent or insufﬁcient, or is too discordant to allow
science-based assessment of the possibility of health effects”; a
cohort or register-based case control study on magnetic ﬁeld
exposure and Alzheimer’s disease incidence or mortality is
recommended as a high priority; and further studies of the
effects of RF ﬁelds associated with mobile phone use and brain
tumours in children are recommended as a high priority. There
are also large gaps in knowledge and understanding as well as
considerable areas of scientiﬁc ignorance about GMOs in food.
There is also a lack of research into such alternatives to GMOs
as agroecological farming methods which address soil and water
quality as well as food productivity. This has been noted by the
EU Standing Committee on Agricultural Research, which
recently concluded that “low input, high output systems…that
use nature’s capacities, should receive the highest priorities for
funding”.46
There are other complementary issues that increased EHS
research could illuminate. These include analyses of the social
needs that new technologies are intended to address47; alterna-
tive ways of meeting these needs; the distribution of risks and
beneﬁts from new technologies across social groups and genera-
tions; methods for enhanced public participation in helping to
shape the strategic innovation pathways to, for example, sustain-
able food and energy production and the research agendas
needed to adequately support such innovations.3 48 49
The sustainability challenges facing Europe and other
resource and energy intensive economies are considerable as big
business, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), and high-level advisory groups have illu-
strated.50–53 Meeting these challenges will need many innovative
and sustainable technologies and products but without adequate
and anticipatory research into their potential hazards, it is likely
that much ‘unforeseen’ and ‘surprising’ harm and costs will
accompany such innovations.
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